Abstract-Key generation is an important challenge among the issues related to security in wireless sensor network. Each node has a set of keys called key-chain rather than a single shared key. The key-chains are generated at the base station and stored in the ROMs of sensor nodes prior to deployment. This paper brings in the idea of deterministic approach to key generation. There is no need to assume a probability that any two nodes are neighbors. We use combinatorics based approach using a block design technique called symmetric Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD). We construct multiple key-spaces out of a key pool from which the key-chains are formed. The main contribution to this work is the use of multiple key spaces to decrease memory utilization at each sensor node, retain connectivity and still not hamper the resilience of the network. It decreases the redundancy in key generation. It eliminates the dependency between the number of keys in the key-chain and number of nodes in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks consist of many tiny sensor nodes deployed at a high density over region requiring surveillance and monitoring. The sensor nodes typically consist of one or more sensing elements, battery, low powered radio transmitter/receiver, microprocessor and limited memory. Sensor networks deployed in a hostile environment are prone to malicious attacks like eavesdropping, masquerading, traffic analysis etc. Hence, security is more important in sensor networks than in traditional networks.
To provide security, communication between nodes should be encrypted and authenticated. Encryption and authentication algorithms require that the communicating nodes share a secret key. The problem here is how to set up secret keys between communicating nodes? This problem is known as the key agreement problem. There are basically three types of general key agreement schemes: trusted server scheme, self-enforcing scheme and key pre-distribution scheme. The trusted server scheme depends on a trusted server for key agreement between nodes. E.g. Kerberos [1] . There is no trusted infrastructure in sensor networks. Hence this scheme is not suitable. The self-enforcing scheme depends on asymmetric cryptography, such as key agreement using public key certificates. However, limited computation and energy resources of sensor nodes often make it undesirable to use public key algorithms, such as RSA [2] or Diffie-Hellman key agreement [3] . The third type of key agreement scheme is key pre-distribution which is nothing but symmetric key cryptography. This scheme is most widely used and suitable for sensor networks.
The secret keys are stored in the ROMs of sensor nodes prior to deployment. The keys stored must be carefully selected so as to increase the probability that two neighboring nodes have atleast one key in common. Nodes that do not share a key directly must be able to establish a key path where each pair of nodes in the path shares a key.
There are a number of approaches to key pre-distribution. One naive approach is to store a master key in each of the nodes. The nodes use this master key to obtain a new pairwise key. Though it is simple to implement, it has a major disadvantage of single point of failure. If an intruder compromises a node, he is in possession of the master key with which he can compromise the whole network. Hence, this scheme is not resilient. Another approach is to store a set of N − 1 keys in each node where one key is known only to one of the N − 1 nodes (Assuming there are N nodes in the network). This scheme overcomes the resilience problem discussed in the previous scheme, since the capture of a single node will not reveal the secret keys between any pair of nodes. However, if the number of nodes increases, the set of keys to be stored in each node increases proportionally. Since the nodes have limited memory this scheme becomes impractical because N could be large. Moreover, if there are more nodes to be added to the network, the set of keys stored in the nodes have to be updated to include the keys for the new nodes.
Eschenauer et al. [4] proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme. In this scheme hundreds of keys are picked from a key pool and are preloaded in the sensor nodes. The keys along with their identities form the key-chains. The nodes exchange their key identities. They propose to employ Merkle puzzle [5] to secure the key identities. However, the processing at each node increases. They show that for a key pool size of 10000, a key chain of length 75 is enough to obtain connection probability of 0.5. An enhancement to this scheme was proposed by Chan et al. [6] . In this scheme q-common keys are required instead of 1 to be able to increase the security of the communication. However this scheme requires larger key chains and smaller key pool compared to the previous scheme.
Random-pairwise key scheme is a modification over pairwise key scheme. Each node stores a random set of np pairwise keys instead of n − 1 where n is the number of sensor nodes in the network and p is the probability that two nodes are connected. Blom proposed a scheme that allows any pair of nodes to find a pairwise secret key between them. Compared to (N −1)-pairwise key distribution scheme, Blom's scheme uses λ+1 memory space where λ is much smaller than N . Unlike (N − 1)-pairwise key distribution scheme, Blom's scheme is not perfectly resilient against node capture. Instead, it has λ secure property: as long as an adversary captures less than or equal to λ nodes; uncompromised nodes are perfectly secure; when an adversary captures more than λ nodes all the nodes in the network are compromised. Blom's scheme uses one key pool to pick the keys. An extension to this scheme was proposed by Varshney et al. in [7] where multiple key spaces are incorporated.
One disadvantage of these random approaches is that the probability of success is low. Lee and Stinson [8] and Campete and Yener [9] proposed deterministic approach to key distribution using combinatorial design techniques to allocate keys to nodes such that the probability of key share between any two nodes is 1. The amount of memory required per node is some fractional power of the overall network size. The drawback of this scheme is that the same keys are shared between many pair of nodes leading to weaker resilience to node capture.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II gives a background of few of the topics required for understanding this paper. Section III gives the mapping between symmetric design and key distribution and also highlights the construction. Section IV gives the analysis and section V gives some results comparing the proposed symmetric design with multiple key-spaces and existing symmetric design with single key-space.
A. Our contribution
We use deterministic approach for key generation using a block design technique called symmetric Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD). The main contribution to this work is the use of multiple key spaces to decrease the memory utilization and still retain connectivity without hampering the resilience of the network.
II. BACKGROUND
The definitions of some of the terms used in this paper are listed below:
A. Key pool
A pool from which keys are picked is called a key pool. It is analogous to the universal set from which sets are formed. Example 1: Let key pool, P = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13}
B. Key-space
A subset of the key pool which is used to construct key-chains for the sensor nodes is called as a key-space. We know that 2 n subsets exist for a set containing n elements. Hence, for a key pool containing n elements 2 n key-spaces can be constructed. Example 2: For the key pool P having 13 elements, 2 13 key-spaces can be constructed. Each Key space is constructed using some criteria. Lets say, the key-spaces, KS 1 = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7}, KS 2 = {1,3,5,7,9,11,13} and KS 3 = {8,9,10,11,12,13} are 3 key-spaces used by a designer.
C. Key-chain
A set of keys assigned to each sensor node is called as key-chain. Key-chains are subsets of key-spaces. Example 3: Two key-chains formed from KS 1 are k 1 = {1,2,3}, k 2 = {1,4,5} and are assigned to sensor nodes numbered N 1 , N 2 . k 3 = {1,7,9}, k 4 = {9,11,13} and k 5 = {3,5,7} are key-chains formed from KS 2 and are assigned to sensor nodes N 3 , N 4 , N 5 .
D. Key-path
Sensor nodes that do not share a key directly may use a path where each pair of nodes on the path shares a key. Such a path is called as a key-path. Example 4: If sensor nodes N 1 and N 2 has to communicate, they find 1 as the common key in their key-chains. Hence they use 1 as the secret key for their communication. Suppose N 1 and N 4 has to communicate, there is no common key in their key-chains. In such a case we say that there exists a key-path from N 1 to N 4 via N 3 . This is because N 1 and N 3 share 1 as common key and N 3 and N 4 share 9 as common key. The network formed with these five nodes is as shown in figure 1.
E. BIBD
A Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) [10] is an arrangement of v distinct objects into b blocks such that each block contains exactly k distinct objects, each object occurs in exactly r different blocks, and every pair of distinct objects occurs together in exactly λ blocks. The design can be expressed as (v, k, λ), or equivalently (v, b, r, k, λ), where:
A BIBD is called Symmetric BIBD or Symmetric Design when b = v and therefore r = k. A Symmetric Design has four properties: every block contains k = r elements, every 
F. Latin square
A Latin Square on n symbols is an n × n arrangement such that each of the n symbols occurs exactly once in each row and in each column where n is the order of the square. 
G. Orthogonal Latin Squares
The Latin Squares A = (a ij ) and B = (b ij ), each of order n are orthogonal if all entries of the join of A and B are distinct.
H. MOLS
Latin Squares A 1 , A 2 , ..., A r are Mutually Orthogonal Latin Squares (MOLS) if they are orthogonal in pairs.
I. Complete Set
For prime power n, a set of (n − 1) MOLS of order n is called a Complete Set [10, 11] . Example 7: For n = 4, there exists three MOLS each of order 4 that forms a complete set.
J. Projective Plane
A Projective Plane is an abstract mathematical concept and can be defined as a set of lines and a set of points, the relation between the lines and points being called as incidence and satisfying the following properties:
• Given any two distinct points, there is exactly one line incident with both of them.
• Given any two distinct lines, there is exactly one point incident with both of them.
• There are four points such that no line is incident with more than two of them.
In other words, we can say that a projective plane of order q > 1 is such that;
• Any line is incident with q + 1 points.
• Any point is incident with q + 1 lines.
• There exists q 2 + q + 1 points and the same number of lines.
The smallest possible Projective plane is the Fano plane as shown in figure 2 . It has seven lines and seven points. It is a projective plane of order q = 2. Any line is incident with 2 + 1 = 3 points. Any point is incident with 2 + 1 = 3 lines. There exists 2 2 + 2 + 1 = 7 points and an equal number of lines. 
III. COMBINATORIAL BASED KEY GENERATION
In the following sections, we describe the use of combinatorics in generation of key-chains for sensor nodes in sensor networks.
A. Mapping
We are interested in constructing Finite Projective Plane of order m which is nothing but a (m 2 + m + 1, m + 1, 1) symmetric design.
We assume that the sensor nodes are deployed in large numbers randomly and the key-chains are stored in the ROMs of the nodes prior to deployment. Let N be the number of nodes in the network. Each sensor node has K keys in its key-chain. The K keys are selected from a Key-space KS which is a subset of the Key Pool P . Each node has to share λ keys to communicate securely.
If the sensor network contains N nodes, N number of keychains has to be generated, i.e., a symmetric design with b ≥ N blocks needs to be generated from an object set S. We now partition the nodes into a k n number of groups. Each node belonging to one group will pick the key-chain from the corresponding key-space. For example, if a node N 1 belong to group k 3 , it will be deployed with a key-chain picked randomly from the 3 rd key-space KS 3 . Hence k n is also the number of key spaces generated for the network of size N .
Let m be a prime power such that there are m 2 + m + 1 nodes present in each group. Hence we construct a symmetric design with v = b = m 2 + m + 1 objects and blocks for the corresponding key-space. We can map the object set S of the symmetric design to the key pool P . A subset of the object set forms the key-space KS. The blocks b can be mapped to the key-chains K. Hence the number of blocks is equal to the number of key-chains, also equal to number of sensor nodes corresponding to a key-space. The objects in the block can be mapped to the keys in the key-chain. This provides b ≥ N key-chains each having K = k = m 2 + m + 1 keys in its keychain. From the property of (m 2 + m + 1, m + 1, 1) design, each pair of blocks can share λ = 1 object. This means, each pair which picked its key-chain from the same key-space has λ = 1 keys in common. The mapping is as shown in the Table  1 .
B. Construction
To generate a (m 2 + m + 1, m + 1, 1) design we use the following approach. First, we generate a complete set of (m − 1) MOLS of order m. This can be used to construct a Affine plane of order m which makes it a (m 2 , m, 1) design. This can be converted to a projective plane which is a (m 2 +m+1, m+ 1, 1) design. The construction process can be summarized as follows:
1) Given N , the number of nodes in the network, find a prime power n where n 2 + n + 1 ≥ N. space. There are a number of ways in deciding the value of m and k n . The approach we adopted was to find the value iteratively. We begin with the value of m = n/2 and compute the number of key-spaces necessary to form the required number of keychains. That is, find k n such that k n (m 2 + m + 1) ≥ N . Repeat the above process for prime powers less than m such that k n (m 2 +m+1)−N is a feasible value. The value k n (m 2 + m+1)−N is the number of extra key-chains generated by the design. Stop the iteration when this value becomes reasonably small. Since the iterations cannot be carried out indefinitely, we stop at four iterations and choose the value for m and k n which gave the least value for k n (m 2 + m + 1) − N . The key-spaces are constructed such that any pair of keyspaces do not form a disjoint set. A pair of nodes which picked its key-chain from different key-spaces may or may not contain a key in common. Since, the key-spaces are non-disjoint, there exists a key-path of length greater than 1, if not a direct path.
Thus formed projective planes for each of the values k n becomes the required key-chains.
IV. ANALYSIS
In the modified symmetric design, any pair of blocks chosen from a single key-space has atleast one object in common ,i.e., any pair of key-chains chosen from a single key-space has atleast one key in common. The key-spaces are constructed such that two neighboring nodes whose key-chains are taken from different key-spaces have either a key in common or there exists a key-path between them. Hence, the probability of key share between any pair of nodes is 1. This implies that any two nodes can communicate securely.
Resilience can be defined as resistance against node capture. Compromise of security credentials, which are stored on a sensor node or exchanged over radio links, should not reveal information about security of any other links in the network. Usually higher resilience means lower number of compromised links [12] . An attacker may be able to monitor the network and capture the nodes wisely or he may capture the nodes randomly. Say, an attacker tries to capture the nodes which have the same specific key in their key-chains. From the properties of symmetric design, for a single key space, we know that there are m + 1 keys in the key-chain. Every pair of keys can occur in exactly one key-chain within that key space. Hence every k n (m 2 + m) keys must be pairing with the specific key in these k n (m + 1) key-chains. So, a wise attacker needs to capture k n (m+1) key-chains to compromise the entire network. But, if the attacker is unlucky and selects the nodes randomly. He might be capturing those k n (m 2 ) keychains which do not pair with the specific key. Hence, he has to capture one more key-chain in each key-space to compromise the whole network. Therefore, an unlucky attacker will need to capture k n (m 2 + 1) key-chains to be able to recover all the keys or in other words, to compromise the entire network.
V. RESULTS
With multiple key spaces the length of the key chain is m + 1, which would have been n + 1 in symmetric design which uses single key-space. Since m < n/2, the key chain length is very much reduced. This is a main advantage since the sensor nodes have limited memory. Even though the key chain length is reduced, the network remains connected with a high probability. The comparison of key-chain lengths for different number of nodes in the sensor network in case of both symmetric design with single key-space and symmteric design with multiple key-spaces is shown in figure 3 . With the use of multiple key spaces, resilience of the network is not hampered. When a node is compromised the intruder has keys taken from one particular key-space. This information is not sufficient to comprise other parts of the network. Hence, he has to compromise more number of nodes to get enough keys to capture the entire network. The graph in figure 4 shows that the minimum number of nodes to be compromised is almost the same in symmetric design with single key-space and in symmetric design with multiple keyspaces. The combinatorial design generates more number of keychains than the number of nodes in the sensor network. An efficient algorithm design should be such that the number of extra key-chains generated is as small as possible. This will ensure that unnecessary computations are avoided. The comparison of this computational overhead is shown in figure  5 . The novel idea brought in by this paper is the use of multiple key-spaces instead of a single key-space in the construction of key-chains. Adding to the advantage of using a deterministic approach, we have a few more results derived which prove that this method is better than using a single key-space. Generation of each key-space is left as a part of implementation. The more is the complexity involved in the key-space generation from the key-pool, the better this method proves out to be. The concept of k n (> 1) key-spaces itself proves lesser memory utilization, connectivity in the network and yet have the same network resilience. There exists no dependency between the number of keys in the key-chain and the number of nodes in the network.
